Abstract. An approach is presented for modeling networks of processes that communicate exclusively through message passing. A process (or a network) is defined by its set of possible behaviors, where each behavior is an abstraction of an infinite execution sequence of the process. The resulting model is simple and modular and facilitates information hiding. It can describe both synchronous and asynchronous networks. It supports recursively-defined networks and can characterize liveness properties such as progress of inputs and outputs, termination, and deadlock.
Abstract. An approach is presented for modeling networks of processes that communicate exclusively through message passing. A process (or a network) is defined by its set of possible behaviors, where each behavior is an abstraction of an infinite execution sequence of the process. The resulting model is simple and modular and facilitates information hiding. It can describe both synchronous and asynchronous networks. It supports recursively-defined networks and can characterize liveness properties such as progress of inputs and outputs, termination, and deadlock.
A sound and complete temporal proof system based on the model is presented, it is compositional -a specification of a network is formed naturally from specifications of its components.
Introduction
A number of models exist for networks of processes [3, 4, 6-8, 15, 22] . None of these models handles both synchronous and asynchronous communication in a single framework. In addition, the modeling of liveness properties is generally unsatisfactory. The models that seem most promising, due to their simplicity and information-hiding ability, are those based on traces. A trace, an abstraction of a process state in which irrelevant internal details have been hidden, is a finite sequence of events that have occurred on the input-output ports of a process during some execution. A trace represents the state reached by the process after some computation in which the events of the trace occur.
Liveness properties, such as progress and termination, are difficult to specify in tracebased models. Some liveness properties deal with complete, possibly infinite, execution sequences, while traces specify only finite prefixes of execution sequences. For example, a property like "eventually a message is sent on port k" may fail to hold of a particular infinite computation even though every finite prefix (hence every trace) of the computation is also a prefix of some other computation for which the property does hold. It is difficult to see how a model based on finite traces could be used to specify such a property.
This problem is related to the question of continuity of processes. A process, defined as a set of traces, is continuous if the least upper bound (tub) of any ascending chain of traces in the set also belongs to the set. Using the partial order "is a prefix of" on traces, nondeterministic processes are not continuous in general -the lub of an infinite ascending chain of traces need not represent an execution sequence, even though each trace in the chain does. We know of no simple model of processes that preserves continuity. Continuity is desirable, since it makes analysis of semantics more elegant. However, since there seems to be no natural way to achieve continuity, and since we are able do without it, we see no reason to insist on it.
To allow better specification of liveness properties, our model of a network uses the notion of observation -a generalization of traceand behavior. An observation records the data read and written on all ports of a network (or process) up to some point in an execution of the network and also records on which ports the networks is ready to communicate at that point. A behavior of a network is the sequence of observations recorded during one of its executions. The resulting model is simple and facilitates information-hiding. Further, it supports both synchronous and asynchronous communication. Our temporal proof system, which is based on the model, is compositional, i.e. a specification of a process is formed naturally from specifications of its component processes. Hoarelike proof systems for concurrent processes -e.g. [4, 5, 11, 16, 17] -are compositional but lack expressive power and cannot deal with temporal properties; temporal proof systems are more complicated, and most of them -e.g. [12] [13] [14] -are not compositional. We believe that this is a problem with the underlying models rather than with temporal logic itself. The models underlying most proof systems are statetransition models, in which a program is specified by a (binary) transition relation on the set of states. Such models are suitable for a Hoarelike proof system because the pre-and postconditions in it correspond naturally to the initial and final states of the relation. For temporal proof systems, modeling processes by behaviors seems more appropriate. Our temporal proof system is compositional due to the modularity and information-hiding properties of the underlying model. It is also sound and relatively complete.
Two proof systems on traces, [5] and [16] , are special cases of our system, in that the sets of specifications allowed in their systems are proper subclasses of those allowed in ours.
The basic system
Throughout, we will be referring to sequences of elements. Our terminology and notation for sequences is as follows. A (possibly infinite) sequence s of elements is written as [s(0), s(1), s (2) Finally, T and F denote the Boolean constants "true" and "false", respectively.
The model
A process, as depicted in Fig. 1 , has a finite number of distinctly named input and output ports. Networks of processes are formed by linking some input ports of some processes to some output ports of other processes in a oneto-one manner. This is done by making the names of the linked input and output ports identical. A network can itself be viewed as a process; its external ports are the unlinked ports of its component processes. Formally, a syntax to describe processes and networks is given by the following: where the components N i are themselves network descriptions. The input (output) ports of a parallel composition are the input (output) ports of its components. The sets of input-port names of distinct components must be disjoint, and similarly for the output ports. This requirement allows a name to occur (once) as both an input and an output port; such a port is said to be linked. An external port of the network is a port that is not linked. [] Note that a primitive process is a (degenerate) network. On the other hand, we can view a network that is a parallel composition as a single process whose linked ports are hidden; we give it a description P(..., ih,... ;"" ,Jk, "") where P is a name that identifies the network, the i h are its external input ports and the Jk its external output ports.
We view a network as an active computing agent that receives and sends messages on its ports. The semantics of a network is the set of all possible input/output behaviors that it can exhibit. This notion is now developed.
(2. 1.3) Definition. An event is a pair (x, k) where x is a datum and k is a port name; (x, k) is said to occur on k. A trace on a set of ports is a finite sequence of events on those ports. [] There is a rather subtle point here concerning the input events:
-If the message transmission is synchronous -i.e. a process cannot send anything until the receiving process is ready to accept it as input-then the input events of a trace describe the data read by the process.
-If the message transmission is asynchronous -i.e. a process can send an output as soon as it is ready without having to wait for the receiving process-then the input events describe the data that have appeared at the input ports of the process. Lemma2.5.3) . This also has the consequence that the notion of "time" becomes a qualitative one. Time has been abstracted to a total ordering, and we can talk about the relative order in which events occur, but not about the exact time or step at which an event occurs. Lamport [10] also introduced invariance under repetition (of states), which he called "stuttering". He felt that it should be impossible to express "how long" or "how many steps" -this was a property of an implementation and not the operation-and stuttering was one way of preventing it. He also felt that "introducing the next operator would destroy the entire logical foundation for [the] use [of temporal logic] in hierarchical methods" [10] . We need the next operator in our system -not for specifying individual processes but for axiomatizing the notion of behavior. To prove liveness properties of synchronous networks, we need to associate with each network a predicate on behaviors (e.g. justice, fairness), which we call a liveness assumption. If 7/ is a liveness assumption, then a process is specified by its T-behaviors, i.e. its behaviors that satisfy T. To ensure that the set of T-behaviors of a process is closed under finite repetition, we require that 7/ itself be invariant under finite repetition, i.e. a satisfies 7* iff any T obtained from a by finite repetition of observations satisfies T (see (2.1.8)). All results of this paper hold if behaviors are everywhere restricted to T-behaviors.
Temporal logic and network specifications

Temporal assertions on behaviors
We assume familiarity with temporal logic -see e.g. An example will help to indicate the difference between local and global symbols. Let port names i and j be local and n be global; n has one value throughout, while i and j have (possibly) different values from state to state. The following temporal formula has the interpretation: if port i's trace eventually has length n, then so does port j's trace. Similarly for A, 7, etc.
-9 w is any term or formula.
i.e. [2] w means w is always true. Whenever w is true in a model, we say that the model satisfies w. For a set of axioms and theorems of temporal logic, see [12] [13] [14] .
We now define what it means for a behavior to satisfy a temporal assertion. To do this, we show how an observation s is treated as a state:
Assign to each (local) port variable k the sequence of values of events on k;
Assign to the local function symbols ln, Out, and Rd the corresponding communication and length-of-sequence-read functions of s.
(To be rigorous, we should write InCk" ) instead of ln(k), where "k" is a denotation of the port name k in domain D, since In is a function of the port itself and not of its value. The same thing applies to Out and Rd.) -Assign to the local predicate symbol ~ the "precedes" relation on the events of the trace of the observation: ("h", m)~("k", n) iff the mth event on port h occurs before the n th event on port k in the trace. Thus ~ is a total ordering.
Thus, temporal formulas can be interpreted over behaviors.
Network specifications
We define a specification as follows: 2) The interpretation of specification (P)R is: Every behavior of P satisfies R.
Rather nicely, if the only free variables of R are the names of P's external ports, then (2. For each process below we give two specifications, one under the assumption that the communication is asynchronous, the other that it is synchronous. We assume that there is no particular liveness assumption 7 ~. Below, 0* is the set of all sequences consisting of a finite number of zeros and 0* 1 is similarly defined.
Example. Process BUFF1 (one-slot buffer) iteratively reads input on port i and reproduces it on port j. Its asynchronous specification is
The synchronous specification of BUFF1 is
Example. Process BUFF2 reads no input on port i and produces an arbitrary, finite number of 0's followed by a 1 on port j. Its asynchronous specification is
The synchronous specification of BUFF2 is
The specifications for BUFF2 illustrate some subtleties of such temporal-logic specifications. First, note that both specifications require Out(j) to be continuously true until the final 1 is written on port j. Omitting the second conjunct of the asynchronous specification yields a specification that allows Out(j) to be false from time to time, but the last conjunct would still specify that a member of 0"1 is eventually on j.
Omitting the second conjunct from the synchronous specification, however, yields a specification that allows behaviors that write nothing on j. We can't place the conjunct ~[Z]je0*l in the synchronous specification because whether anything is written on j depends on the whim of the process that will read from j. In conjunction with fairness assumption (2.4.1) and appropriate specifications for a receiving process, however, one can prove ~OjeO* 1.
The proof system
Our basic proof system consists of the following six parts: Vm, nF-](m< [kl A n > Ill A n= I OII 0 ((" k", m) < ("/", n))) i.e. the event that extends a trace occurs after all the existing ones in that trace. It is clear that any behavior satisfies these axioms. Now let a be an infinite sequence of states that satisfies these axioms. Each state can be interpreted as an observation by letting < be the ordering on the trace, In and Out be the communications functions, Rd be the length-ofsequence-read function, and the values of the port variables be the events of the trace. By induction on k, it is easy to show that each a k is a legitimate observation and that a satisfies the properties of behaviors.
Proof rules
There are 3 proof rules in the basic system:
.3.13) Renaming rule. (P [h/k] > R [h/k]
where h and k are vectors of distinct port names. P[h/k] is the network that results from simultaneous substitution of port names h for port names k in P, provided that no unlinked port becomes linked as a result of the substitution and provided that the rules governing port names still hold (see Def. (2.1.2)). R[h/k] is conventional simultaneous substitution -of port names-in logical formulas. 
<U) S
where R ~ S can be proved using the first four components (2.3.1)-(2.3.4) of the proof system.
Examples
Example. Consider the network in Fig. 3 . Process P1 reads nothing on k and produces a 1 on h. Process P2 reads an input from h and then produces a 1 on k. The network behaves differently according to whether message transmission is asynchronous or synchronous: in the asynchronous case, a 1 is eventually produced on k; in the synchronous case, nothing is produced on k.
Suppose the network is asynchronous. The process specifications are
By the network formation rule, the network satisfies the conjunction of the above assertions. By the consequence rule, it follows that
Now suppose the network is synchronous and assume the liveness assumption is that of fairness:
(2.4.1) for any port i,
We have By fairness assumption (2.4.1) and because ln(h) and Out(h) are continuously T as long as Ihl =0, eventually I hl = 1 in the network, and P l's specification yields h= [1] . Since ln(k) is continuously F, no output is ever produced on k. Therefore
Example. Brock and Ackerman [3] give an example to show that specifying processes only by "history relations" gives rise to inconsistencies: two asynchronous networks whose component processes have the same history relations have different history relations. We show here that this does not arise using our proof system; our proof system is expressive enough to express the difference between these component processes using external specifications. Consider the network of Fig. 4 . The component processes have the following precise specifications (in English and in our system). All the specifications contain a safety specification and a liveness specification. D1 reads one value on i and writes it twice on j:
where preshuffle(j,n, k) means that k is a prefix of an element of shuffle(j, n):
u {b" kl kcshuffle(a "j, n)} P1 reads a value on k and reproduces it on l, reads another value on k and reproduces it on l, and stops:
P2 reads two values from k and then writes them on l (+ is integer division):
P1 produces an output each time it reads an input, whereas P2 produces no output until there are at least two inputs. A history relation specification of a network gives for each possible set of input sequences on the input ports all possible sequences on the output ports. For example, the history relation specifications for $1 and $2 are the same and are given in the following table. The trouble with a history relation specification is that it does not describe the relative order in which events occur. Thus, the difference between P1 and P2 has been lost in embedding them in S1 and $2.
D2 reads one value on m and writes it twice on n"
MERGE nondeterministically merges the values from j and n onto k:
We now show that $1 and $2 have different external specifications in our system. In (2.4.2) below we give an external specification for $1.
The first conjunct of the specification restricts the values that can appear on output port l. The second conjunct indicates that if there is one input then two values will eventually be written on I. The third and fourth conjuncts capture the fact that if one input port remains empty until output appears on l, then the first value on 1 is the first value on the other input port. Such a statement cannot be made using history relations.
We now show that this specification holds.
By the network formation rule, S1 satisfies the conjunction of the specifications for D1, D2, MERGE, and P1. From the first conjuncts of these specifications, 
.4) ~([il+lm[> l)~[]ll]=2.
We now prove that S1 satisfies the third conjunct of (2. 
Soundness and completeness
Soundness and completeness are defined as follows. Let L be a temporal assertion language whose only local function symbols are In, Out, and Rd and whose only local predicate symbol is <. Let I be an interpretation whose domain D contains a set of elements (e.g. integers) and a set of sequences of these elements (e.g. sequences of integers). Global variables range over elements or sequences; local variables over sequences. Let {P~} be a set of primitive processes, from which networks of processes are to be formed. We now establish a result that explains why proofs of non-interference -as defined in [11] -are not needed in our proof system. The proofs of soundness and completeness of the basic proof system depend on this "non-interference property".
(2.5.3) Lemma. Let I and d be sets of port names, and let R be an assertion in which (a) the only free variables are local (port) variables in I u J, (b) there is no occurrence of In(j) and Rd(j) for jcJ-I, and (c) there is no occurrence of Out(i) for icI-J. Then for any behaviors ~ and z, ~]1,j='clx, j implies r satisfies R iff z satisfies R, that is, satisfaction of R depends only on the interpretations of port variables occurring (free) in R.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of R. The induction hypothesis is:
Note that the induction hypothesis implies the lemma.
Consider the structure of R. Suppose R is an atomic formula. Then a(k..) satisfies R iff R is true in a k. But a k and "c k assign the same values to all the terms and predicate symbols in R. So a(k..) satisfies R iff z(k..) does.
Suppose R is composed using classical logical operators, temporal operators, or quantification over global variables. It is easy to see from the definition of the truth values of the formulas that the induction hypothesis is preserved in each of the cases. [] Note that if we do not rule out quantification over port variables, then interference may occur. For example, if R is the assertion "for all ports k different from i and j, k is empty at all times", then clearly R does not satisfy the noninterference property. This in turns implies that the network formation rule is unsound. This condition is also needed -but is unmentioned-in the proof systems of [5, 16, 17] . Now, it is easy to see why the remarks surrounding (2.2.3) and concerning interpretations of (P>R are true. An external behavior of a network is just the restriction of a behavior of the network to its external ports. So every external behavior of a network satisfies an assertion on its external ports iff every behavior of the network satisfies the assertion. 
.). It follows that
Procedural and reeursive networks
We now extend the model to include recursive networks, a useful abstraction that can model constructs of languages such as Concurrent Prolog [23] and the parallel language of [9] . This requires us first to define procedural networks, in which certain components do not begin execution until activated by neighboring components, so that we can restrict attention to a useful class of infinite networks in which only finitely many processes can be active at any time.
Procedural networks and subroutine components
A procedural network is one in which certain components are designated as subroutines, which may not execute until activated externally. We impose the same unique port-naming requirement as in Def. (2.1.2) for ordinary networks: the sets of input (output) port names of distinct components of a procedural composition are disjoint. The input, output, linked and external ports are also defined as for ordinary networks. Finally, we require that all ports of subroutine components be linked in P, i.e. no subroutine component is connected to an external port of the procedural composition. [] Graphically, we represent a subroutine component of a procedural network by a double circle.
A procedural network may have infinitely many ports, though only finitely many of them can be external. The definitions of event, observation and behavior are not affected by this.
In a procedural network, each subroutine is initially inactive and may not begin executing until a neighboring process attempts to communicate with it. To formalize this notion, we define activation and execution of network components in terms of behaviors.
(3.1.2) Definition. Let Q be a subroutine component of network P. Let I and J respectively be the sets of external input and output ports of Q, I' the set of all (external and linked) input ports of Q, and J' the set of all output ports of Q. Then predicates act(Q) and inert(Q) are defined as follows.
act (Q) = (~/i~, Out (i)) v (~/j~ j In (j)) inert (Q) = (/~ i~ i '--n In (i)) /x (/~ ~ ~ j,~ 0 ut (j))
Formula act(Q) is true of a behavior iff in its first observation some process is ready to send to or receive from Q; we say that the observation activates Q. Formula inert (Q) is true of a behavior iff in its first observation Q is not ready to send or receive on any port. We say that Q is inert in any such observation. [] (ii) Suppose Qj is activated in some observation of a. Then for some q, Qj is inert in the observations of o-(1..q--1) and
a(q..)[oj~[[Qj]]. []
A subroutine process Qj does not begin execution -its communication functions and those to which it is connected remain false, so its trace is empty-until a neighboring process activates it. Once activated, however, Qj must eventually execute.
The point at which Qj begins execution is subtle. If the empty observation (trace empty and communication functions false) is a valid initial observation of Q j, then execution can be thought of as beginning at the observation in which Qj is activated -or indeed anywhere before that. Nothing needs to be done to initiate its execution. However, if the empty observation is not valid, so that a communication function must be initially true on some port of Q j, then something needs to be done to initiate execution of Q j, and the observation at which its execution begins is the first one in which Qj is not inert. Technically, this definition helps to preserve the finite repetition property (2.1.8).
The requirement in Def. (3.1.1) that all ports of subroutine processes be linked ensures that each behavior of a procedural network uniquely determines whether its subroutine components are activated. The requirement that there be only finitely many main components ensures that, even in an infinite procedural network, only finitely many subroutine processes have been activated at any time.
The proof system to cover procedural networks is the basic proof system with the following replacement (3.1.4) for the network formation rule (2.3.14). In the conclusion of the proof rule, the second part is a temporal formula expressing exactly (3.1.3)(c)(i) for all subroutine processes and the third part expresses (3.1.3)(c)(ii). Because a procedural network may contain infinitely many components, a complete proof rule requires the use of infinitary logical operators. Completeness. Since Lemma (2.5.3) still holds, to prove relative completeness, it is sufficient to prove that rule (3.1.4) preserves preciseness of specifications.
Let (Mi)R i and (Qj)Sj be precise specifications, and let a be a behavior on the ports of ]]('",Mi, "'" ;'", Q.i, "") that satisfies the procedural network's specification in (3.1.4) . We have to show that a is a behavior of the procedural network, i.e. that it satisfies (3.1.3)(c). First, for every main component Mi, tTlM i satisfies Ri, by non-interference. So qIMi ~ [Mi] ]" Second, the behavior satisfies the second conjunct of the conclusion of the proof rule, which is a temporallogic formulation of (3. Conversely, if a is a behavior of the procedural network, then a satisfies the network's specification in the proof rule, by the soundness of the rule. Hence the proof rule is precise. []
Recursive networks
Informally, a procedural network is recursive if some of its subroutine processes are designated as "recursive copies" of itself. For clarity, we restrict attention to recursive networks with a single recursive copy and no other subroutine process. Relaxing this restriction is tedious but straightforward. X(hl, ..., hm; kl, ..., k,)) where, except for the fact that X is not a primitive process name, each X(...; ...) is a primitive process description, the righthand side is a procedural network description, and the two sides have the same external input and output ports. [] See Fig. 5 for an example.
We will define the behaviors of a recursive network to be the behaviors of the infinite procedural network obtained by "unrolling" the recursive definition. Defining unrolling requires 
Intuitively, Gr+ t(X) is a uniquely renamed copy of the "body" of X, with its external ports renamed so that they link to Gr(X ) instead of the recursive instance of X. An example appears in Fig. 6 .
The "completely unrolled" infinite procedural network for X is F(X)= I1(..., ... ;
G2(X), ...)
Such a network is depicted in Fig. 7 . The behaviors of X are defined in terms of F(X): (3.2.2) Definition. Let X and F(X) be as above.
We define []-X]] = [[F(X)]I. []
The reader may find the unrolling process slightly unconventional. The "obvious" way to unroll a recursive definition would lead to an infinite procedural network in which the nesting of subroutine subnetworks was infinitely deep, and this would be inconvenient for technical reasons. Its equivalence to our "flattened" network can be seen from the following lemma. provided these compositions satisfy the requirements for unique port names (note that both sides of the equality are legal if either is).
Proof. 
.; )) R <X(i;j)) R A /~, (inert (G,) JV" (act (G,) A inert
where R, is obtained from R using the same substitution of names used in generating G, from ]I(-.., N, ... ; ).
The soundness and completeness of this rule follow directly from the soundness and corn-pleteness of the rule for procedural networks, from which this rule was derived.
Example
Consider synchronous recursive network PRIME shown in Fig. 8 .
Process P produces on j the first value from i followed by all the values from m. At the same time, P produces on 1 those values from i that are not divisible by the first value from i.
A formal specification for P is
where
and indiv(s, a) is the subsequence of s containing the elements that are not divisible by a. We want to prove
where ODDNUM and ODDPRIME are the infinite ascending sequences of odd numbers and odd primes greater than 1, respectively, and prime(i) is the sequence of primes in i. By the renaming rule, we obtain
(G~(PRIME)) [Z]S~ A T~
where (19) 
)
By the proof rule for recursive networks, we have (3.3.1) (PRIME) [ 
~SA T A /~ n(inert(G,) Y(act(G,) A inert(Gn))) A A n(~act(G,) (inert(G,)~ll (QS, A T,)))
See Fig. 9 .
Safety
We first prove the safety specification
From (P)mS, by applying the proof rule for recursive networks and using the fact that S, is satisfied by the empty observation on G,(PRIME), we obtain
it follows that PRIME satisfies at all times 
Hence
[-]iF-ODDNUM ~ Dj[-ODDPRIME
Liveness
We take the liveness assumption to be that of fairness if a linked port is enabled infinitely often then eventually communication must take place.
~lkl> n)
We now prove the liveness specification
Since (P)DIn(m), GI(PRIME ) is activated as soon as P starts executing. Similarly, all the G,(PRIME) are activated eventually. Hence the specification (3.3.1) of PRIME can be simplified to (PRIME) DSA TA AnO(DS, A T,)
Assume 9 By fairness assumption (3. 
The case n=O is trivial. Hence PRIME satisfies the required liveness specification.
Extensions to handle termination and deadlock
The basic model and proof system allow us to deal with any specification concerning communication between processes that can be written in temporal logic. Thus, one can specify such properties as progress of inputs and outputs. However, the basic model cannot describe termination and deadlock because these properties involve internal states of a process. For example, a network should not be considered terminated unless each of its component processes is terminated. To model termination and deadlock in the presence of information hiding, we add global bits of information to each communication behavior. These bits contain the essential abstraction of the information that would otherwise be lost when information is hidden.
Termination
To characterize termination of a network, we add to each behavior a termination bit t~ {T, F}. Intuitively, t= T means the network terminates; thus, if t= T we require that the behavior "appears" terminated. Formally, [t/tp] . By the non-interference property, a' satisfies it, too. So (t', a') satisfies S ~ R. S ~ R is satisfied by every T-behavior. Hence (P)R is provable from (P)S by the consequence rule, i.e. it is provable in the system. By induction on the structure of a network, we can prove that every network specification that is true is provable.
Hence the proof system is relatively complete. []
Deadlock
We introduce some terminology concerning the ports of a network N. The external ports of N Ii ,~ 0ra, To characterize deadlock, we introduce the notion of waiting: a network is in a wait state if it cannot change state without a communication event taking place on one of its external ports. We add two bits of information to each behavior. The wait bit w means that eventually the network reaches a wait state and remains in that state forever. The deadlock bit d means that eventually the network becomes deadlocked, i.e. there exists a nonempty set D of components of the network such that Every member of D is in a wait state, and All exposed and external ports of the network that are ports of members of D are disabled by D (i.e. members of D cannot communicate with one another and refuse to communicate with outsiders).
These conditions agree with the usual intuitive requirements for deadlock. Formally: While surprising, this property is not technically a problem, and it is reasonable to take the view that the way processes are composed should affect our view of whether a system is deadlocked.
There is, however, a different notion of deadlock for which associativity is preserved: a network is totally deadlocked if all its component processes get into deadlock -i.e. the set D in Def. (4.2.2) above consists of all the components of N. This notion of deadlock is treated in [4] . Using a wait bit and deadlock bit as above, rule (b) for forming the deadlock bit in Def. (4.2.2) above now becomes d=T iffall d i=T or (i') w~=T for alli: and (ii') Eventually all exposed and external ports of the network are disabled by the network forever.
It is not difficult to see that "all di=T" implies (i') and (ii'). Hence, the definition can be simplified to d=T iff (i') and (ii') hold.
In fact, we do not even need a deadlock bit, since (i') and (ii') do not mention d. Now it is straightforward to prove that ]I(N 1 .... ,gn) is totally deadlocked iff H(II (N1,N2) , ..., gn) is. By induction, associativity follows.
To prove deadlock (freedom), we associate with each network N global variables dN, wNe{T,F }. It is clear how the renaming and consequence rules should be modified. The new network formation rule is 
Discussion
We have presented a new technique for process modeling that uses the notion of behavior. This technique gives rise to a model of processes that is as simple as those based on traces (e.g. [3, 4, 7, 22] ) but that is more general and expressive. Our model is more suitable for temporal reasoning than state-transition models" a sound and complete temporal proof system based on the model is simpler than comparable proof systems based on state-transition models, e.g. [-2, 13, 14] .
As an illustration, we compare our basic proof system to two other proofs systems.
In Chen and Hoare's system [5] , a specification of process P has the form P satR, where R is a first-order logic assertion. The interpretation is that every trace produced by P satisfies R. This is equivalent to stating (P} DR in our system. In Misra and Chandy's system [16] , a specification of a process P has the form eIPIS, A 3j<=k(~S holds at point j))) = -n (R ~'--n S)
Hence, the specification RIP IS can be written in our system as {P}~(R~#-n S). Misra and Chandy's proof system is also shown to be incomplete in [19] .
We have extended the technique to deal with sequential processes [18] , and we are applying them to the shared-memory model of concurrency. These issues will be reported in a forthcoming paper.
